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Controlling Street-level Drug Trafficking: 
Evidence FroiD Oakland and Binningham 
By Craig D. Uchjda, Brian Forst, and Sampson 0. Annan 
Two large U.S. cities-Oakland, Califor-
nia, and Birmingham, Alabama-served as 
testing grounds for the effectiveness of 
several different policing models for con-
trolling the problem of street-level drug 
trafficking. The National Institute of Justice 
subsequently tested and assessed the mod-
els to determine their effectiveness. 
The study examined the models' impact on 
the reduction of reported crimes as well as 
Itizens' perceptions of their own safety 
and the extent of crime in their 
neighborhoods. 
Police departments in the two cities used 
special task forces and also "community 
policing" techniques to identify and. arrest 
drug traffickers. Generally, both methods 
left citizens believing that police were more 
effective than prior to the experiments. 
Furthermore, crime rates in the experimen-
From the Director 
Throughout the United States, a major 
priority of police departments is the control 
of street drug trafficking. Drug markets are 
always accompanied by an atmosphere of 
crime-including robbery, murder, and 
random violence-that creates an atmo-
sphere of fear within the community. Law 
enforcement officials know that flagrant 
drug markets on our cities' streets openly 
challenge their authority and diminish the 
public's sense of security and confidence in 
police. 
The National Institute of Justice (NU) is 
engaged in comprehensive research to 
learn which enforcement strategies and 
tactics have an impact on street drug traf-
tal neighborhoods decreased, particularly 
for violent crimes. 
This Research in Brief highlights the 
study's findings with an indepth look at 
how two large police departments are 
dealing with drug trafficking and drug-
related crime. 
Background 
In 1987, Oakland and Birmingham re-
ceived funds from the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance (BJA) for support in controlling 
drug trafficking. Soon afterward, NIJ 
awarded funds to the Police Foundation to 
evaluate the programs in both cities. 
Oakland's Drug Problem. As in other 
cities, drug trafficking has been a serious 
problem in Oakland for more than a dec-
ade. Drug-related homicides have created 
ficking and on the fear residents feel when 
neighborhood streets are taken over by drug 
dealers. In the mid-1980's, NU sponsored 
some of the first research on "community 
policing," which can be generally defined 
as a method of policing that increases the 
police officer's involvement in, and coop-
eration with, the neighborhood and its 
citizens. 
This Research In Brief describes the way 
two large police departments have dealt 
with the problems of drug trafficking and 
drug-related crime. Police in Oakland, 
California, and Birmingham, Alabama, 
employed special task forces for identifying 
and arresting drug traffickers. They also 
incorporated, to a limited extent, some of 
an aura of fear in some neighborhoods. 
About 27 percent of the homicides com-
mitted in Oakland in 1984 were believed to 
have been drug related. In 1987, nearly 50 
percent of the 114 homicides were drug 
related. 
Crack cocaine emerged during this time, 
with sellers and buyers openly dealing 
crack in residential neighborhoods across 
the city. Controlling street-level drug traf-
ficking became much harder for the Oak-
land Police Department. The widespread 
drug trade compounded existing enforce-
ment problems for the understaffed depart-
ment. Compared to cities of similar size, 
Oakland ranked among the top five in 
reported homicides, robberies, and burglar-
ies per police officer. 
To combat the street-level drug traffickers, 
the Oakland Police Department put to-
the techniques of community policing. The 
findings highlight the potential of police-
citizen contacts both in stemming crime 
and encouraging positive attitudes toward 
police. 
The findings of this study add to our under-
standing of drug traffic control as well as 
community policing. They show that spe-
cial enforcement strategies can be used in 
combination with community policing 
techniques to reduce some types of reported 
crime, reduce citizen fear of crime, and 
enhance the public's perception of police 
services. 
Charles B. DeWitt 
Director 
National Institute of Justice 
gether "Special Duty Unit 3" (SDU-3), a 
corps of hand-picked, specially trained 
patrol officers who engaged in undercover 
buy-and-bust operations, aggressive patrol, 
and motor vehicle stops. As part of the 
BJA-funded program, the department also 
agreed to try a community policing ap-
proach, enlisting residents to join the po-
lice in controlling the retail trade of illegal 
drugs on the street. 
Birmingham's Drug Problem. Illicit 
street-level drug trafficking emerged as a 
serious problem in Birmingham around 
1985. Birmingham drug traffickers sold 
powder cocaine and Dilaudid, a heroin 
substitute. Street-level trafficking was 
prevalent in public housing areas, but not 
throughout residential neighborhoods as in 
Oakland. Also, drug enforcement in Bir-
mingham was the responsibility of vice/ 
narcotics detectives, with as few as a dozen 
narcotics officers responsible for control-
ling the entire city's drug problem. 
In 1988, the Birmingham Police Depart-
ment (BPD) embarked on a multiphased 
program known as Operation 'Caine 
Break, aimed at street-level drug traffick-
ers. The narcotics division targeted buyers 
and sellers through buy-busts and sting 
operations. One precinct captain in the 
study devoted a group of patrol officers to 
a community-oriented approach. 
Drug Control Through 
Community Policing 
To deal with the street-level drug problem, 
both police departments expressed a desire 
to use components of community policing. 
Community policing, in this instance, was 
limited to a few specific techniques, rather 
than a philosophical change by the police 
agencies. Certain elements of community-
oriented policing were not adopted by the 
police in either city. 1 
1 Members of the police agencies did not fully 
embrace the fundamental aspects of commu-
nity policing, but expressed a desire to explore 
its possibilities. Their efforts are more fully 
described in Craig D. Uchida, Brian Forst, and 
Sampson Annan, Modern Policing and the 
Control of Illegal Drugs: Testing New 
Strategies in Two American Cities, NIJ, 1992. 
In Oakland and Birmingham, the commu-
nity-oriented approach to drug enforce-
ment involved the use of directed 
police-to-citizen contacts. Both depart-
ments chose this strategy because of its 
success in the Newark and Houston police 
departments' fear reduction efforts,2 spon-
sored by the National Institute of Justice. 
The police wanted to establish contact 
with residents through door-to-door inter-
views to inform them that the department 
would intensify patrols in drug-trafficking 
areas. In addition, the police hoped to alert 
citizens to the signs of drug trafficking, 
and instruct them not to attempt to inter-
vene personally when they observed drug 
dealing. 
Evaluation Efforts 
At both sites, the evaluation used a pretest-
posttest quasi-experimental design. The 
Oakland program included SDU-3 and 
door-to-door interviews, structured so that 
each aspect could be evaluated within a 6-
month field experiment in 4 of the city's 
35 beats. 3 In Birmingham, three beats were 
selected to evaluate Operation 'Caine 
Break and the door-to-door contacts by 
police. 
The Oakland Design. In Oakland, four 
treatment and control sites were chosen at 
random. Beginning on May 1, 1988, and 
ending October 31, 1988, Beats 7, 25, and 
34 received treatments while Beat 11 
served as the control site. In Beat 34, both 
the door-to-door approach and the special 
duty unit activities were applied. In Beat 
25, officers applied the special duty unit 
activities and conventional strategies. In 
Beat 7, the door-to-door campaign com-
bined with conventional strategies. In Beat 
11, existing police operations were main-
tained at their preexperimentallevels and 
strategies. After 6 months, the different 
strategies rotated among the beats, making 
Beat 25 the control area. 
2 See Antony Pate et al., Reducing Fear of 
Crime in Houston and Newark, Washington 
D.C., The Police Foundation, 1986. 
3 At both sites, beats were matched and selected 
based on census data, crime data, drug arrests, 
and police officer input. For more details on 
target selection, see Uchida et al., cited in note 
1 above. 
2 
The Birmingham Design. To evaluate t:I( 
Birmingham Police programs, two police 
beats were selected to receive treatment 
and one to serve as the control area. Two 
were in the South Precinct (Beats 61 and 
62) and the third in the East Precinct (Beat 
84). A survey of residents gathered 
baseline perceptions of the neighborhoods' 
crime problems prior to implementation of 
the program. Beats 61 (Goldwire) and 84 
(Gate City) received treatment, with Beat 
62 (Kingston) serving as the control. 
Operation 'Caine Break was measured in 
Goldwire. In Gate City, the door-to-door 
approach was measured. In Kingston, 
current police operations were maintained 
at their preevaluation levels and strategies. 
After this period, a second survey was 
conducted to find the effects of the 
program. 
Data. The researchers used observational 
and official data to ensure that officers 
implemented the programs and followed 
experimental conditions.4 To evaluate the 
programs and determine their impact, the 
research team relied on both survey data 
and reported crime data. At both sites, a 
survey panel of residents in each beat wa~ 
selected and interviewed at two different 
times.5 Research staff collected reported 
crime data for each beat and for each city 
as a whole to find whether the experimen-
tal treatments changed patterns of crime. 
Besides these data sources, the research 
team collected and analyzed newspaper 
articles from the Oakland Tribune and 
from the Birmingham Post-Herald. 
4 In Oakland, a trained observer using a 
structured observation form rode with the 
narcotics officers on a weekly basis for a year. 
In Birmingham, a trained observer rode with 
detectives for 6 months on a bimonthly 
schedule. At both sites, arrest data (including 
all narcotics arrests), crimes reported to police, 
and drug hotline calls (in Oakland only), were 
collected for the analysis. 
5 A systematic random sample of residents in 
each beat in both cities provided information 
about residents' perceptions of drug traffick-
ing, quality of life, property and personal 
crime, police services, and safety. Two waves 
of interviews were conducted by survey · 
researchers. In Oakland, the overall response 
rate for Wave 1 was 57.6 percent and for Wavp 
2 was 75 percent. In Birmingham, the overall 
response rate for Wave I was 84 percent and 
for Wave 2 was 77 percent. See Uchida et al., 
note 1 above, for details. 
10iice Techniques in Oakland 
and Birmingham 
Oakland's Special Duty Unit. Speoial 
Duty Unit 3 (SDU.-3) consisted of six 
patrol officers and one sergeant. These 
officers perfonned many activities in uni-
form and undercover. To follow the Unit's 
activities and ensure adherence to the 
experiment, a trained observer rode with 
the officers on a weekly basis for one year, 
taking detailed notes of police-citizen 
encounters. 
The majority of the time, officers made 
traffic stops of motor vehicles and bicycle 
riders; questioned groups or individuals 
who appeared to be engaging in drug activ-
ity; talked with residents about problems; 
and engaged in stops and frisks where they 
suspected violations were present. 
During these high visibility patrol , two-
officer teams patroUed target beats and 
used their discretion in making stops or 
conducting surveillance. Arrests were not 
stressed, but nonetheless could occur. The 
officers spent the remainder of their time 
n buy-busts and raids on crack houses. 
Buy Busts. Buy-bust have been used in 
Oakland to control drug trafficking since 
1986. The typical buy-bust operation fol-
lowed this sequence of events: 
At the evening shift roll call, the sergeant 
designated the areas for enforcement 
within til target beats and assigned indi-
vidual ta ks. Anonymous tips, patrol offi-
cer observation., and SDU-3 surveillance 
helped detennine target beats. 
Two officers, dressed in undercover cloth ~ 
ing, made up the "buy" team. With marked 
bills, these officers mad undercover buy 
of crack cocaine from dealers in res idenlial 
areas. The rest or the officers were mem-
bers of the arrest team. They wore bullet-
resi ·tant vests and windbreake1 bearing 
police identiftcalion, and drove "semi-
marked police vehicles.6 The arrest team 
usually ituated itself just four or ~ive 
blocks away f1·om the sellers maintaining 
constant radio contact with th buy team. 
' While the vehicles were not clearly marked 
/~u·o.l cars. they were recognizable by mo~;t 
suspects ru~d citizens because f their color and 
style--LJSlllllly a gray or maroon Dodge 
Diplomat with special antenna . 
The buy team located dealers, infonned the 
backup team of their location, and then 
made a deal with the drug seller. Because 
drug ll<tfficking was so r<unpant in the 
early day of the experiment, it was ea y to 
find willing ellers. When the buy team 
was successful, it immediately notified the 
backup team via hand-held radios. The 
arre ·ring officers d1en moved in as quickly 
a possible. Their speed u ually took the 
sell r by c mpl.ete surprise. Officer ai o 
arrested any buyers i11 the vicinity. The 
entire operation lasted 5 to I 0 minutes and 
was visible to the citizens in the area. Once 
SDU-3 collected all the evidence, the 
officers moved on to a new target. A typi-
cal evening in May 1988, th first momh 
of operation, netted about 12 arrests. 
During the summer months in 1988, SDU-
3 an·ests increased dramatically. The traf-
fickers began to ch<mge their location by 
111 ving a few blocks away, or they bjd the 
dtugs in nearby hideouts such a under the 
steps of a porch, in a brown paper bag or 
in a cup) rather lhao on themselves. Mor 
import:antly, tbe dealers beg<mto recognize 
the officers by sighr and by nmn , causing 
afety pr blem. for undercover officers. 
By mid-Augu ·t the undercover officers 
complained that Beat 25 had "dried up.' 
Efforts then ·hifted to Beat 34 where traf-
fickers were mor abundant. 
l n response to the change in ta tics by the 
dealers and their increased familiarity wilh 
SDU- 3 different officers rotaLed into the 
unit as "buy" officers and u eel several 
vehicles in the operations. Other changes 
in tactic incJudcd the increased use of paid 
inf01mant . Officers que tioned suspects to 
obuun informati n about new drug loca-
tion · and traffickers. 
During this period the unit arrested several 
major drug traffi.ckers. By the end of th 
summer, the observer reported visibl 
signs f jmprovement in Beat'> 25 and 34. 
Community Policing. In Oakland, six 
police service technicians (PST's) were 
assigned to conduct interviews and distrib-
ute pan1phlet: about drug trafficking in two 
beats (7 and 34).7 In Bi.m1ingham, six 
police officers volunt ered to conduct 
interviews and distribute pamphlets about 
crime prevention to the residents of Gate 
City, a public housing development. Ques-
tionnaires asked citizens about problems in 
their neighborhood (particularly drug 
3 
Lrafficking), ab ut the whereabouts of drug 
traffickjJtg, the relative condition of their 
neighb rhood, tmd what they fell should be 
d ne about the problems. ln addition, 
Oakland Police di tributed a p::u11ph let 
describing the signs of drug trafli king and 
promoting their drug h tline. 
to Oakland. initiaJ c ntacto; began on May 
L 1988, and continued until October 3 L, 
1988. During the 6-month period, officers 
completed I Jl29 interviews out of 3,177 
occupied households (57.6 percent).8 
These figures are comparable to those in 
the Newark study, where interviews were 
completed in 52 percent of the occupied 
unit'iY 
In both Oakland beats, "dmgs" were men-
tioned as an in1portant problem more than 
50 percent of the time. Resident also 
mentioned concern about other problems 
associated with the drug trade: traffic, 
peeding cars, noi e, sh lings and vio-
lenc , burglaries and thefts. 
Complaints of dmg trafficking at specific 
locations by residents were noted and 
passed on to the SDU-3 sergeant. The unit 
often used the buy-bust tactic at these 
locations. However, completion of inter-
views did not mean that the "community-
oriented" appr ach wa. fully implemented. 
The police rarely had there ources to 
follow up on the problems identified in the 
urveys. The sergeant in SDU-3 did use 
the questionnaires when selecting enforce-
ment areas for the officers, but systematic 
problem-s lving and followup with the 
resident · did not occur. Because of Lhe 
problems associated with the Oakland 
Police Department's implementation of the 
door-to-door component, one would not 
expect this approach to be highly effective 
in controlling drug trafficking. 
1 Use of nons worn officers rather than heat 
of!icers 1.0 make door-to-door con La ts runs 
counter to standard c mmunity poli ing 
techniques in other cities. 
MUsing 1980 Census figures. Adjusting for 
police observations of vacant househOlds, 65 
percent of occupied household · were con-
mcted. 
'' Antony Pate und Wes Skogan, Fear Red/11:-
tion in Newurk. Washington. D.C.: T he Police 
Foundation, 1985:27. 
Birmingham 
Operation 'Caine Br~k. ln March of 
1988, narcotics detective-s began "Opera-
tion 'Caine Break" in selected areas in the 
city. Th operalion was divided i.nt two 
phas s: ( I ) the "straight-buy" approach 
targeted at sellers and (2) a sting operari n 
aimed at buyers. The narcotics detectives 
carried out these strategies in areas where 
street-level clntg trafficking wa highly 
concentrated. They agreed to stay out of 
the control area, Beat 62, Kingston, and the 
d r-to-door only area, Beat 84 Gate City, 
for a 9-month period. 
During Phase I, undercover officers used 
unmarked vehicle equipped with video 
and audio recording devices, and bought 
drugs from dealers. Ea :h transa tion wa 
recorded surrepti.tious'J y, with anests oc-
cun-ing only after everal complet d trans-
actions with each seller. 
The standard buy-bust operat1on her 
consisted of this equence of vents. Two 
undercover offic rs con timted the 'buy" 
team. They used marked bills to make 
buys-typically Dilaudid or powder co-
caine. The officers drove a van with video 
equipment hidden on th da ·hboard and in 
th back of the vehicle. They bought drug 
from dealers on street comers or in front of 
homes. The rest of the officers were me~n­
bers of Lhe backup team that monitored the 
buy team U1rough radio contact. Thes 
officers situated themselves four or five 
blocks away, well within striking di tance 
if any problems arose. 
The officers conducted this operation from 
March 22 to July 29, 1988. The operation 
culrnjnated November 15-17, 1988, when 
arrest wammts for the sellers were served 
en masse. 10 
Phase ll: Sting Operations. The second 
phase of the projectlnvol ved use of a new 
piece of legislation enacted in Alabama in 
1988. Prior to 1988, soliciting for the pm·-
posc of purcha ing dntgs was a misde-
meanor. The Alabama Legislature, with 
the assistance of the Jefferson County 
District Attorney's office and l:he Birming-
ham Police Department, elevated the statu 
10
'T11e time lag frotn buys to busts was due to 
the paperwork and identification of tbe sellers 
by patrol and nnrcotics officers. 
ofU1e crime to a felony. Drug ' oliciting is 
now ubject to the same penalty a if the 
act of exchanging drugs actually took 
place. 
Narcotics detectives set up a sting opera-
tion, called "Operalion 'Caine Break, 
Phase 11." During the peration, under-
cover officers po ed a street-comer drug 
dealers, waiting for customers to drive up 
to them and a k to buy drugs. A video and. 
audio taping machine set up in a "boom 
box - a Large, portable stereo ca, sett 
player--documented the transaclion. One 
undercover oft1cer held the machine on his 
shoulder, acting as if he were li tening to 
mu ic through stereo headsets. Inside the 
machin , a video camera recorded what 
went on. The head et~ were conne ted to a 
radio transmitter that allowed the officer to 
listen to instructions from the surveillance 
ream parked two blocks away in an under-
cover van. The other officer, wired with 
a microphone, spoke to the potential 
offenders. 
A ~urveiUance van wa always within sight 
of the undercover officers, and two marked 
poli.ce cars ~ere nearby. A total of 12 
narcotics and patrol officers participated in 
the operation. ln addition, ad puty district 
attomey often rode in the surveillance van. 
Narcotics detectives were extremely con-
cerned about the safety of the undercover 
ofticers and the legality of the sting opera-
tion. Extensive training took place before 
implementation of the program. Patr I 
officers and narcotics detectives were 
taught procedw-es to ensure their safety, 
and were requiJed to wear body armor. A 
deputy distri l attorney pres nted the legal 
aspe ts of the operation. Officer· parli i-
pated in role playing and a series of trial 
runs to learn the proper procedures. 
Ordinarily, a customer would drive up to 
the undercover officers who stood n a 
street comer where drug trafficking was 
active. The officers would a ·k Lb person 
what he wanted. Wh n he named a particu-
lar drug, the undercover officers would ask 
to see his money. Once he showed moo y, 
it satisfied the Alabama State law govem-
ing drug solicitation: the deal was consum-
mated. Drugs and money were not usually 
exchanged. The undercover officer would 
divert the buyer, suggesting that p lice 
were in the area. This forced th buyer to 
drive off. 
4 
When the driver left the scene of the drug 
solicitation, uniformed officers in a marked 
vehicle stopped the car. At times, suspects 
got traffic tickets for vi lations such as 
driving with a suspended license, but no 
arrests were made regarding dmg activity. 
The suspects were told that the police were 
making routine stops because the area was 
known for drug activity and that the area 
was dangerous. A videocamera strategi-
cally located in the patrol car recorded this 
sequence of events. When the patrol offi-
cers asked suspects to get out of the car, 
they placed them in front of the pau·oJ car 
facing the camera. Thi ensured clear 
pictures of the individual suspects. 
Eighty-three arrest warrants were served in 
De ember, charging 80 peopl with olicit-
ing for the purpose of obtaining nar otics. 
BPD officer were also able to seize 32 
vehicles because the deals were conducted 
while the buyers were in their cars. The 
police then began civil forfeiture proce-
dure to gain ownership of the vehicles. 
In both phases, the BPD conducted large-
scale "bust-outs." This served to maximize 
exposure by the media and to inform the 
public and offenders of the police program. 
The police hoped to send a powerful mes-
sage to the community that drug traffickers 
were being dealt with, and that both deal-
ers and buyers were being held account-
able for their actions. 
During each arrest phase, members of the 
department held a press conference. News-
paper reporters and television crews ac-
companied the officers to the homes of 
suspects and recorded the arrests. The 
Birmingham Post-Herald and the Birming-
ham News gave extensive coverage to the 
bust-outs. 
These bust-outs served other purposes as 
well. By delaying arrests, the police pro-
tected identities of the undercover officers 
from the dealers and buyers. This strategy 
enabled the police to build strong cases 
against both parties. Videotaping several 
straight buys with each seller minimized 
identification and evidentiary problems. So 
too for the reverse buys. During Phase II 
officers were particularly concerned about 
testing the new State law and problems of 
entrapment. To alleviate these concerns, a 
deputy district attorney rode with the sur-
veillance team and viewed all videotapes 
before filing charges. 
.::::ommunity Policing. In Binningham, 
police selected a public housing develop-
ment for the directed police-citizen con-
tacts, or door-to-door interviews. During 
the five-month period officers completed 
344 interviews out of 598 dwelling units 
(57 .5 percent).'' 
In discussing neighborhood problems, a 
plurality of residents mentioned drugs ( 44 
percent). In addition, residents frequently 
mentioned other crimes associated with 
drugs-such as shootings and violence, 
burglaries, or robberies. 
The door-to-door interviews were com-
pleted as quickly and as thoroughly as 
possible, but the followup plan to conduct 
problem-solving was curtailed and eventu-
ally abandoned, due to changes in the 
police organization. 
Unanticipated Change: The Police Sub-
station. During a 14-day period in August 
1988, 11 people were shot at in Kingston, 
the study's control beat. One person was 
killed and 10 were wounded in 8 separate 
incidents, most of them drug related. In the 
1ftennath, the residents, the public housing 
authority, and the police made changes that 
affected the evaluation. 
After the violence began, the Binningham 
Housing Authority made immediate 
wholesale changes-repairing street lights, 
beginning a cleanup campaign, and trans-
ferring additional security officers to the 
housing development, Morton Simpson 
Village. In addition, the police increased 
their patrols of the neighborhoods. Citizens 
also held anti-drug rallies in August and 
October to demonstrate their solidarity 
with the police and the pubic housing 
authority. 
With the assistance of the Housing Author-
ity, the police opened a substation in 
Morton Simpson Village-an apartment 
within the development, fortified by heavy 
wire mesh and iron bars on the front door. 
Four patrol units (eight officers) staffed the 
station 24 hours a day. This provided con-
stant police presence and visibility. 
11 As with Oakland, this is a conservative 
figure. Vacancies increased the proportion of 
occupied household interviewed to 60 percent. 
The substation opened at the same time the 
enforcement and community-oriented 
programs were implemented. Thus, the 
second wave of interviews could still be 
used to measure the effect of the substa-
tion. New questions were added, incorpo-
rating the changes. Since the control group 
no longer existed, the analysis became a 
comparison of traditional drug enforce-
ment versus the new community policing 
efforts. 
Impact of the Strategies in 
Oakland and Birmingham 
The police and the research team were 
interested in the effect these programs had 
on community perceptions of drug traffick-
ing, quality of life, satisfaction with police 
services, fear of crime, and victimization. 
To examine these effects, the researchers 
used measures from the citizen survey. 
Citizens responded to a series of questions 
about drugs, police, and their neighbor-
hoods, both before and after the imposed 
treatments. Attitudes of the citizen panel in 
each beat helped define the effectiveness 
of the programs. 
Citizen Perceptions 
Drug Trafficking. In Oakland, SDU-3 
and the door-to-door contacts had favor-
able effects on citizen perception of drug 
trafficking. Drug trafficking as a problem 
decreased because of the treatments associ-
ated with the special enforcement unit and 
in the combination area. In addition, citi-
zens in Beat 25 credited police with doing 
a better job of controlling street-level sales 
and use of illegal drugs. 
In Binningham, the treatments prompted 
few changes in citizen perceptions of drug 
trafficking. Kingston residents perceived 
that police had improved their ability to 
control street-level drug trafficking as a 
result of the substation. No changes oc-
curred in the other areas. 
Quality of Life. The treatments in Oak-
land had no perceived impact on residents' 
quality of life. In Binningham, residents in 
Kingston perceived that their neighbor-
hood had improved significantly because 
of the police substation. In the other two 
Binningham beats, attitudes of residents 
regarding quality of life did not change. 
5 
Property and Personal Crime. Oakland 
residents perceived that vandalism of cars 
decreased in the combination beat and the 
SDU-3 beat. The other three perceptions 
remained the same. Residents believed that 
sexual assault incidents increased in the 
beat that included the door-to-door 
component. 
In Binningham, changes in attitude about 
property crime were significant, though in 
a negative way. Surveys conducted before 
and after the intervention showed that 
residents in Gate City perceived that an 
increase in break-ins, stolen cars, and 
thefts occurred. Conversely, in Kingston, 
residents perceived that the number of cars 
being stolen decreased. These findings 
suggest that the door-to-door campaign 
might have increased the awareness and 
perception of citizens regarding property 
crime. Because the residents were more 
aware of the problems, they believed that 
property crime had increased as a problem 
at the time of the second survey. This 
coincides with the increase in reported 
property crime within Gate City. 
Residents' perceptions regarding violent 
crime did not change in any of the Bir-
mingham beats. 
Police Services. In Oakland, citizens were 
more satisfied with the police response to 
community problems in the area that re-
ceived the door-to-door treatment only. 
In Binningham, residents in Kingston 
perceived that the police were more re-
sponsive to their concerns, helped more 
victims, worked with residents to solve 
problems, spent more time in the neighbor-
hood, and kept order. These findings are 
not surprising given the active police pres-
ence and visibility created by the new 
substation. 
Residents who participated in the door-to-
door treatment in Gate City believed the 
police were more responsive to their con-
cerns and that the police were spending 
more time on important problems in their 
neighborhood. 
Safety. In Oakland, perceptions of safety 
increased because of the treatments in all 
three areas. In Binningham, perceptions of 
safety did not change. The relatively short 
time the treatments were in effect might 
have been the reason. 
Additional Resident 
Perceptions in Birmingham 
During Wave 2, Birmingham residents 
were asked additional questions about 
police performance. 
Residents of Gate City, Kingston, and 
Goldwire answered questions about the 
impact of the police substation. All the 
respondents in Kingston had heard about 
it, plus 83 percent of those in Gate City 
and 74 percent in Goldwire. In all three 
beats, over 72 percent of the residents 
believed that the substation was either 
somewhat effective or very effective in 
reducing drug-related crime. 
Crime Data: Oakland 
To measure the impact of the programs on 
reported crime, the researchers analyzed 
data received from Oakland police over a 
28-month period. Citywide and Beat data 
for Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) Part I 
offenses were provided for the 16-month 
period prior to program implementation 
and the 12-month period of the programs. 
Citywide Crime Patterns. The number of 
robberies reported to the police throughout 
the city stayed about the same during the 
entire 28-month study. Burglaries in-
creased from a mean of 1,675 to 1,861 per 
month, about 11 percent, and violent 
crimes declined from 265 to 204, a drop of 
about 23 percent. 12 
Of particular interest are the numbers for 
violent crimes. They show that homicides, 
rapes, and felonious assaults decreased 
during a period when other cities saw rapid 
increases in drug-related violence. While 
the research found no empirical evidence 
to show that drug enforcement efforts 
throughout the city resulted in this de-
crease, one cannot ignore the possibility 
that the efforts of the Oakland Police De-
partment and the community made a dif-
ference in the level of violence. 
Beat 7. During the period that Beat 7 re-
ceived the door-to-door treatment, a 25 
percent decrease in violent crimes oc-
curred, but slight increases took place in 
12 These citywide data exclude the figures for 
the target beats. 
robberies (+7.8 percent) and burglaries 
(+8.6 percent). Addition of SDU-3 en-
forcement to the door-to-door component 
during the next phase of the evaluation 
coincided with a marked decrease in both 
robberies ( -41.2 percent) and violent 
crimes (-19.5 percent). 
Beat 11. Beat 11 served as the control area 
during the first phase of the evaluation and 
then received the police-citizen contacts 
during the second phase. All crime catego-
ries show a decrease when this area served 
as the control. When the door-to-door 
component was added, no change occurred 
in robberies. 
Substantial increases in burglaries took 
place during the door-to-door campaign 
(40.4 percent). This increase in reported 
burglaries may be attributable to the door-
to-door contacts and may be an unintended 
consequence of these interviews. Residents 
may have felt more comfortable in talking 
with the police and thus reported occur-
rences more often. 
This beat is an anomaly, because it does 
not follow the crime trends that occurred 
citywide. The research team expected to 
find crime patterns that were similar to 
citywide data across all crime types; that 
was not so. The Oakland Police Depart-
ment could not provide any compelling 
explanations for the fluctuations. 
Beat 25. Beat 25 received SDU-3 enforce-
ment during Phase I and became the con-
trol beat 6 months later. A decrease in 
violent crimes took place when this beat 
received the special enforcement, while 
robberies and burglaries increased by 
almost 20 percent. Without SDU-3 en-
forcement, robberies continued their up-
ward trend, though the numbers appeared 
to fluctuate considerably. 
These data suggest that SDU-3 enforce-
ment alone had little impact on the tradi-
tional drug-related crimes of burglary and 
robbery, but seemed to have an effect on 
violent crimes. The increase in violent 
crime when the special enforcement team 
was taken out of the area confirms this 
theory. Increases in burglary and robbery 
may have been the result of drug dealers 
turning to these activities because their 
income from drug dealing had decreased. 
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Beat 34. The combination of SDU-3 and 
the door-to-door police-citizen contacts 
reduced the mean number of violent 
crimes and robberies in Beat 34. Burglaries 
increased marginally. Without the door-to-
door component, the number of robberies 
and violent crimes increased to their pre-
experimental levels. Burglaries decreased 
by 9.6 percent. 
Crime Data: Birmingham 
To measure the impact of the programs on 
reported crime in Birmingham, the re-
search team analyzed data received from 
the Birmingham Police over a 33-month 
period (January 1, 1987 to September 30, 
1989). 
Citywide Crime Patterns. The number of 
property crimes (burglaries, thefts, and 
auto thefts) reported to the' police through-
out the city remained stable during the 
entire 33-month study. Violent crimes 
(homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggra-
vated assaults) increased during the study 
period. 
The pattern of violent crime is similar to 
that in other cities that have seen rapid 
increases in violence, particularly those 
that are drug related. 
Gate City. During the door-to-door con-
tacts, violent crime dropped to about 10 
per month but property crime increased to 
69 per month. This represents a decrease in 
violent crimes of about 16 percent and an 
increase of 9 percent in property crimes. 
When the door-to-door interviews ceased, 
the trend continued: Violent crimes de-
creased and property crimes increased 
slightly. 
Goldwire. Residents in Goldwire were 
subjected to almost 18 violent crimes and 
70 property crimes per month before 
implementation of Operation 'Caine 
Break. Once the beat received the buy-bust 
and sting operations, the incidence of 
property crime decreased about 5 percent, 
while violent crimes increased almost 4.5 
percent. When the area reverted to its 
preexperimental stage, the number of 
violent crimes decreased while property 
crimes remained stable. In contrast, the 
data for the entire city during the postex-
perimental stage show that violent crimes 
jumped by 58 percent and property crimes 
increased by almost 17 percent. 
These data suggest that the enforcement 
efforts of Operation 'Caine Break may 
have had a lag effect on the reporting of 
property and violent crimes. Without such 
efforts by detectives, the crime pattern in 
Goldwire may have matched those 
citywide. 
Kingston. Kingston received the police 
substation. Violent crimes increased by 15 
percent during implementation, while 
violent crimes throughout the city in-
creased by 23 percent. Reported property 
crime remained somewhat stable in 
Kingston, but increased slightly in the rest 
of the city. These findings suggest that the 
police substation had little effect on actual 
reporting of crimes to the police. 
Summary 
Oakland 
In Oakland, the treatments affected citizen 
perceptions of drug trafficking, property 
crime, satisfaction with police services, 
and neighborhood safety. In addition, 
crimes reported to the police declined 
substantially in one treatment area. 
Residents perceived that drug trafficking 
declined. Visible police presence improved 
residents' perception of the ability of the 
police to handle drug problems in their 
neighborhoods. The door-to-door contact 
with police improved residents' satisfac-
tion with the way police handled neighbor-
hood problems. Despite the fluctuations in 
crime statistics in the different beats, resi-
dents in all three treatment areas believed 
that they felt safer than before the treat-
ments were applied. 
The perception that sexual assault inci-
dents increased runs counter to our hypoth-
esis; the researchers had expected that 
perceptions of violent crimes would dimin-
ish in the treatment beats. 
Birmingham 
The Birmingham Police received a tremen-
dous amount of positive press coverage for 
their activities in Operation 'Caine Break. 
The two large-scale sweeps of suspects or 
"bust-outs" were successful because of the 
press reports and because the police were 
able to apprehend a high percentage (over 
90 percent) of the suspects they sought. 
The narcotics detectives also believed that 
they had sent a message to drug traffickers: 
That police fully intended to apprehend, 
charge, and convict both the dealers and 
the buyers in the drug trade. 
In both phases of the operation under NIJ 
study, the narcotics detectives were well-
trained, organized, and thorough in their 
work. Their concerns for safety impressed 
the research staff, given the dangers inher-
ent in drug enforcement activities. Equally 
impressive was the concern to follow 
proper legal procedures. Issues of entrap-
ment, search and seizure, stop and frisk, 
proper field interrogations, and probable 
cause were discussed and emphasized 
throughout the project. 
Because of the nature of narcotics work, 
the researchers did not anticipate signifi-
cant changes in the attitudes of the resi-
dents in the area that received the 'Caine 
Break treatment. Narcotics officers relied 
on a low-key approach to their undercover 
operations of stings and the videotaped 
buys. Residents would not see arrests 
regularly, so the impact on community 
attitudes was limited. 
Instead, the research team relied on re-
ported crime as an indicator of success or 
failure of the operation. Team members 
believe that a reduction in crime took place 
after a lag of 3 months in the area that 
received the buy-busts and sting operation. 
The patterns that emerge in the crime data 
discussed earlier suggest that the door-to-
door component had a beneficial effect on 
the control of violent criminal acts. The 
presence and visibility of officers in the 
neighborhood may have reduced some 
violent behavior. Although residents in two 
of the three experimental beats also per-
ceived less property crime, reported prop-
erty crimes actually increased slightly in 
the three beats as a group. This may be a 
useful consequence of the door-to-door 
interviews. Officers encouraged residents 
to call the police when they witnessed 
suspicious activities. In Goldwire, the 
findings show that the treatment was effec-
tive after a 3-month lag. 
Although the researchers had hoped for a 
more intensive use of the police-citizen 
contacts, the results were nonetheless very 
positive. Though the police substation was 
an unanticipated event, the demands from 
the community and officials of the public 
housing authority could not be ignored. 
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Clearly, it affected the residents in the 
Morton Simpson Village, as shown by the 
results of our citizen survey. 
The findings from this study show that 
these treatments had dramatic effects on 
citizen perceptions of quality of life, prop-
erty crime, and satisfaction with police 
services. In addition, violent crimes re-
ported to the police declined substantially 
in Gate City, where the police-citizen 
contacts occurred. 
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